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I. INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets pose unique problems for the discovery process,
especially in cases between current or potential competitors that allege
a misappropriation of trade secrets. When such a case is first filed, the
court has no idea whether either party possesses a trade secret,
whether a misappropriation has occurred, or whether either party used
improper means to obtain the purported trade secret. Those issues will
be determined at the time of trial. Discovery disputes, however, nor-
mally arise before the court has had the opportunity to determine the
merits of either party's claims. In this situation, parties may abuse the
legal system: either by falsely claiming a trade secret privilege to ob-
struct necessary discovery requests, or by filing a frivolous cause of
action against a competitor in an effort to misappropriate the defend-
ant's trade secrets through discovery. Although intangible, trade
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secrets and other intellectual property constitute valuable property1
that require legal protection.'
In considering discovery disputes, courts must balance two con-
flicting legal principles. On one hand, litigants "may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claims
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of
any other party ... ."' On the other hand, litigants have an interest in
preserving the confidentiality of their trade secrets.4 Because discov-
ery necessarily precedes the determination of the merits of a trade se-
cret case, courts must implement creative procedures and orders to
prevent abuse of the discovery process. This article identifies and dis-
cusses the manner in which courts endeavor to prevent the use of the
discovery process to misappropriate competitors' trade secrets.
1". DISCOVERY REQUIRES FULL DISCLOSURE
Charles Alan Wright and Arthur J. Miller have noted three dis-
tinct purposes and uses for modem discovery:
(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be neces-
sary to produce evidence only on a residue of matters that are found
to be actually disputed and controverted.
(2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial.
(3) To secure information about the existence of evidence that may
be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may be
procured, as for instance, the existence, custody, and location of
pertinent documents or the names and addresses of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts. 5
I. JAMES V. VERGAIM & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, FuNDAMENTALs OF COMPUTER - HIOH TECH.
NOLOGY LAW § 12.01(a)(1), at 507 (1991) ('Items designated as intellectual property, such as
information or computer programs, although intangible, are as much assets as are pieces of tangi-
ble property such as buildings, equipment, or money.").
2. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
28 (Foundation Press 1981) (1973) ("The fact that information is intangible gives special reason
for legal protection. Much information has little value to its producer unless it is salable.").
3. FED R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHuR R. MITLER, 8 FED.
ERAL PRACTICE ANm PRoCEDURE § 2001, at 15 (1970) ("The basic philosophy of the present
federal procedure is that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of
all relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged.").
4. UN I. TRADE SEcaErs Acr § 5 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 461 (1985) ("If reasonable assurances
of maintenance of secrecy could not be given, meritorious trade secret litigation would be
chilled.").
5. CHARLES A. WRIGrr AN ARTIUR R. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2001, at 15 (1970) (citing Berry v. Haynes, 41 F.R.D. 243,244 (D.C. Fla. 1966); Broadway &
Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Col. v. Loews Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264,267 (Tex. 1969); Kaarup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 436
N.W.2d 17, 19 (S.D. 1989); Weinstein v. Ehrenhaus, 119 F.R.D. 355,357 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
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Some commentators disagree with these objectives.6
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,7 the United States Supreme
Court refused to extend the public right of access to discovery materi-
als.8 Other courts have limited the public's review of discovery
materials.9 At common law, pretrial proceedings traditionally were
not open to the public."0 Moreover, in modem practice, pretrial depo-
sitions and interrogatories normally occur in private." That line of
cases clearly establishes that the general public has no absolute right
to review trade secret materials produced in discovery but fails to re-
solve problems concerning discovery of trade secrets in litigation be-
tween competitors.
III. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION REQUIRES SECRECY
A. Background on Trade Secrets
Intellectual property encompasses three distinct concepts: pat-
ents, copyrights, and trade secrets. A patent is a government grant to
an inventor that conveys and secures an exclusive right to make, use,
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dissenting opinion); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech.
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D.C. Pa. 1980); Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 91 F.R.D. 97,
99 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Marmon v. Hodny, 287 N.W.2d 470, 476 (N.D. 1980); Rickett v. Hayes,
473 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Ark. 1971)).
6. Id. § 2001, at 19 n. 21 (citing Kenneth B. Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: Whats So
Wrong About Surprise?, 39 A.B.AJ. 1075 (1953); Hocker, What Price Limitless Discovery?, 9
Mo. B.J. 172 (1953); Margeson v. Boston & M.R.R., 16 F.R.D. 200, 201 (D.C. Mass. 1954);
Weyman I. Lundquist & H. Stephen Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End to Trial by Ordeal,
64 A.B.AJ. 59 (1978)).
Justice Brandeis originally did not approve of the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
See FED. Ctv. Jun. Prtoc. ANm Rur.as 6 (West 1990) (quoting Order of December 20, 1937).
7. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
8. Id. at 33 ("[R]estraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not
a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.").
9. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789-90 (1st Cir.
1988)("The parties are, therefore, free to disseminate discovery materials, but they are not obli-
gated to make them publicly available by filing them in court." Id. at 792), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1030 (1989); Courier J. v. Marshall, 828 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1987) (limiting public access to
membership list of Ku Klux Klan produced during discovery); In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987) (limiting public access to discovery materials pro-
duced in bankruptcy proceedings); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (Ist Cir. 1986)
("There is no tradition of public access to discovery, and requiring a trial court to scrutinize
carefully public claims of access would be incongruous with the goals of the discovery pro-
cess."); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 140 F.R.D. 459,465 (D. Utah 1991); Simon v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 119 F.R.D. 683 (D. Minn. 1987); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45
(E.D. Mich. 1985); Omega Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 403-04
(W.D. Va. 1987). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987); United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146,
153 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
10. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-91 (1979).
11. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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and sell an invention for a specified term of years.12 In order to ob-
tain a patent, the invention must be disclosed to the public.13 A copy-
right similarly is a government grant for the exclusive privilege of
multiplying, publishing, and selling certain literary or artistic produc-
tions. 4 The value of a copyright is that the owner has a limited mo-
nopoly over the work even if it is made public. By contrast, a trade
secret is not generally known by others, and its only exclusivity de-
pends on private efforts to maintain its secrecy.15  An inventor of a
new product has three options: 6 obtain a temporary monopoly by fil-
ing a patent application, forego a monopoly by publishing the inven-
12. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) ("In consider-
ation of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An
exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon the expiration of that pe-
riod, the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restric-
tion to practice it and profit by its use." (citations omitted)).
13. See generally id. at 186 ("In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit
to the community, the patent is granted.").
14. The term "copyright" has specifically been defined as:
The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An
intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of cer-
tain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period,
with the sole and exclusive privilege or multiplying copies of the same and pub-
lishing and selling them.
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting BLACK's LAW DicrbON.
ARY 304 (5th ed. 1979)).
15. The Restatement of Torts and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provide widely accepted,
similar definitions for the term "trade secrets." The Restatement provides that:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in ones business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or pre-
serving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that:
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SEcP -rs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985).
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides a more expansive definition by deleting the re-
quirement for use in business. The broader definition "includes information that has commercial
value from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy and expensive research
which proves that a certain process will not work could be of great value to a competitor." Id. at
439, cmt.
16. RicHARD I. MLFR, LE.'A. AsPECrs OF TEcHNoLoGy UTILIZATION 12-14 (1974).
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tion, or attempt to maintain an indefinite competitive advantage by
keeping the invention secret.17
Since its founding, the United States has provided express protec-
tion for intellectual property. The United States Constitution states
that, "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries ... ". " In 1790, the First Congress of the United States enacted
the patent 9 and copyright systems.20 American courts have consid-
ered trade secret litigation for over one hundred and fifty years. 2
Courts have enunciated two fundamental policies underlying
trade secrets laws. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,22 the United
States Supreme Court wrote that, "The maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly
stated policies behind trade secret law . . . [The commercial world
depends on] 'good faith and honest, fair dealing.'"23 Invention and
advancement may be encouraged by protecting the trade secret24 and
punishing those who resort to improper means to acquire a trade se-
cret.2 Commentators have set forth several philosophical arguments
supporting exclusive ownership of intellectual property, and, there-
fore, secrecy concerning trade secrets.26
17. See, e.g., RrOSDALE ELLIS, TRADE SEcRS § 166, 233-36 (1953) (If an inventor delays
filing a patent application beyond the statutory period, the inventor may forfeit the right to a
patent).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. 1 Stat. 109-10 (1790).
20. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
21. See, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889) (contract dispute concerning secret
medicine); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (employee enjoined from disclosing former
employer's manufacturing secret with subsequent employer); Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1
Pick.) 523 (1837) (debt on a bond concerning a secret manner of making chocolate).
22. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
23. Id., at 481-82 (quoting National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) at
462 [13-23 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468] (1902); citing Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965).) See also Steven R. Borgman & William LaFuze, A
General Overview of Trade Secrets - Texas Style, 53 Tax. BJ. 725, 730 (July 1990).
24. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482 (citing A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co.,
73 F.2d 531,539 (6th Cir. 1934); Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960); Water
Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969)).
25. Though a complete list of proper and improper means would be impossible, the Re-
statement of Torts provides a partial list of improper tactics: Using physical force, using fraudu-
lent misrepresentations, tapping telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage. "In general
they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct." RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
26. See, e.g., Alan H. Goldman, Ethical Issues in Proprietary Restrictions on Research
Results, in OwNINo Scmatrmc AND TEcHmcAL INFORMATION 69-82 (Vivian Weil & John Snap-
per eds., 1989) (a financial incentive theory); Charles Weiner, Patenting and Academic Re-
search: Historical Case Studies, in OWNINGo ScrENTnc AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, supra at
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American courts protect trade secrets by prohibiting their misap-
propriation. Eighteen states have enacted criminal statutes27 applica-
ble to employees who have misappropriated their employers trade
secrets. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted
civil statutes28 authorizing private parties to bring civil actions against
others for misappropriating trade secrets.29 Despite no specific statu-
87-109 (a quality control theory); Arthur Kuflik, Moral Foundations of Intellectual Property
Rights, in OwNING Scnamrn-zc AND TECHNICAL INFoRMATION, supra at 219-40 (an exchange for
fairness theory); Michael Davis, Patents, Natural Rights, and Natural Property, in OwNINo Smi.
Ernc Am TECHNICAL INoRmATION, supra at 241-49 (a natural rights theory); EARL W. KN'-
ERa & JACK LAHR, AN INTELLECruAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 206-17 (2d ed. 1983) (property,
confidential relationship, unjust enrichment, and contract theories); ROBERT A. CHOATE, CASES
AND MATERIAL ON PATENT LAW 1-3 (1973) (natural rights).
27. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (West 1988);
CoLo. Rv. STAT. § 18-4-408 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-13 (Michie 1992); ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720 § 5/16-1 (Michie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2 (West 1986);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 353 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (West
1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.772 (West 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637:3 (1986);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-24 (Michie 1984); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Anderson 1979); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1732 (West 1983); 18
PA. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1991); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.05 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West 1993).
28. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945
(1993); ARiz. v. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to 44-407 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 4-
75-607 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426 to 3426.10 (West 1984); COLO. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to 35-58 (West
1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-510
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANNw. §§ 688.001 to 688.009 (West 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to
482B-9 (1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 765,
§§ 1065/1 to 1065/9 (Michie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (West 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (West 1993); KArN. STAT. ANt. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 (1992);
Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880 to 365.900 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431
to 51:1439 (West 1987); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541 to 1548 (West 1992); MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209 (1993); MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01 to 325C.08
(West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (1991); Motr. CODE AtNN. §§ 30-14-
401 to 30-14-409 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (1992); NEV. REv. STAT.
600A.010 to 600A.100 (1991); N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9 (1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7 (Michie 1993); N.D. CaNT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-
08 (1993); OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85 to 95 (West 1987); OR. Rav. STAT. §§ 646.461 to
646.475 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-
29-1 to 37-29-11 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9 (1992); VA. CODa ANN.
§§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to 19.108.940
(West 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West
1989).
29. "Misappropriation" may be defined as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied con-
sent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
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tory authorization, other states provide a common law remedy for
trade secret misappropriation. °
B. Potential Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the
Discovery Process
Courts clearly possess the "power to compel pretrial discovery of
a litigant's secret processes, but whether it should be exercised and
under what protective conditions is governed by the facts of each
case."3I At some point, the plaintiff must identify the specific trade
secrets that allegedly have been misappropriated.32 If the plaintiff is
uncertain concerning which of its trade secrets have been misappropri-
ated, then the plaintiff may need to conduct discovery of defendants
material before specifying the allegedly misappropriated trade
secrets.3 3
In some instances, trade secret litigation involves a request for a
temporary restraining order against use or disclosure of a purported
trade secret.34  A temporary restraining order and a preliminary in-
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(I) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(ID) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake.
UNto. TRADE SEcRETs Act § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985).
30. See generally Restatement of Torts § 757.
31. Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing Claude Neon
Lights, Inc. v. Rainbow Light, Inc., 31 F.2d 988, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1927)).
32. See RoEERT C. Do.R & CHRIsToPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SacREs, PAT-
Nrrs, CoPyiGom-s, AND TRADEMARKs § 1.24, 40-41 (1990).
33. Id. ("Often, the trade secret owner does not know what was taken, and the actual
identification of the trade secret may occur only after full and complete discovery of the wrong-
doers material .... When full and complete discovery has occurred, then specific identification
of the trade secrets can be made.").
34. See MIcHAEL D. Scorr, ScoTT ON CoMPuTER LAW § 6.18[A], 6-44.4 (2d ed. 1993)
("Because of the ephemeral nature of a trade secret, it is imperative that the secret not be re-
vealed to the public or to competitors. The continued existence of a protectible trade secret often
will depend on the owner's success in obtaining an order enjoining the misappropriator from
revealing the secret to third parties. Failure to obtain an injunction in the first instance may make
further litigation moot.") See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction and
every restraining order.., is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.").
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junction frequently result in an expedited proceeding.3" That expe-
dited process gives courts and parties less time to consider potential
discovery problems.
A party also may assert that its documents contain the trade
secrets of a third party that it has agreed to hold in confidence. The
party responding to the discovery request may expose itself to poten-
tial liability from the trade secret owner.36 In such a situation, the
third party may move for a protective order.37
Unless appropriate protective orders are entered, a litigant, in re-
sponding to discovery requests, may be forced to disclose its trade
secrets.38 One court acknowledged the potential danger, writing that:
[T]he circumstance that a litigant in his complaint alleges that he
disclosed confidential and secret processes to a defendant, which
the latter in turn denies, does not automatically entitle the plaintiff
to obtain disclosure of the alleged offending processes in aid of
plaintiffs pretrial discovery - otherwise it would be a simple mat-
ter to obtain one's trade secret by the mere assertion of a claim.
The end result of disclosure, where ultimately it develops that the
asserted claim is without substance, may be so destructive of the
interests of the prevailing party that more is required than mere
allegation to warrant pretrial disclosure.39
In most protective orders, the opposing party, or at least its coun-
sel, becomes aware of the trade secret. In cases between two competi-
tors, or potential competitors, responding to discovery may result in
disclosing a trade secret to the person most likely to use or take advan-
tage of that trade secret.40 Competitors, therefore, may obtain through
a lawsuit knowledge concerning a subject that they are unable to
achieve through independent research.
For example, in a hypothetical lawsuit between competitors A
Widget, Inc. and B Widget Corp. for misappropriation of trade secrets,
35. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) ("In case a temporary restraining order is granted without
notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possi-
ble time and takes precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character .....
36. See Scott, supra note 34, § 18.06[A], 18-3 (1993).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
38. See Scorr, supra note 34, § 6.17, 6-40 ("It would be of little practical value to file a
lawsuit to protect the confidentiality of a trade secret if the secret became part of the publicly
available court record and was thereby lost. Loss of trade secrets by disclosure in pleadings,
documents, or oral testimony is a constant concern during both discovery and trial.").
39. Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
40. See Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 138 F.R.D. 530,
536 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 293, 299
(D. Del. 1985)) ("Courts have presumed that disclosure of sensitive information to competitors is
more harmful than disclosure to a noncompetitor.") See also infra note 151 and accompanying
text.
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several potential problems arise from the discovery process. The gen-
eral public probably has little or no interest in widget trade secrets. A
third hypothetical competitor, C Widget Company, may be very inter-
ested in learning its competitors' trade secrets. Unless the legal sys-
tem ensures confidentiality of trade secrets, A Widget, Inc. may decide
against filing a meritorious claim against B Widget Corp. because of
concerns that C Widget Company may obtain those trade secrets. A
Widget, Inc. also may be reluctant to file a meritorious claim against B
Widget Corp. because A Widget, Inc. may be forced to disclose unre-
lated trade secrets to B Widget Corp. On the other hand, if A Widget,
Inc. is struggling unsuccessfully to compete in the widget industry, it
may file a lawsuit against B Widget Corp. to learn its trade secrets. At
the time the lawsuit is filed, the court has no idea whether any trade
secrets have been misappropriated, or even whether any trade secrets
exist. The problem becomes more complex if the plaintiff relies on
circumstantial evidence to support its allegation.41
The federal courts and most states have adopted specific rules
concerning discovery of trade secrets. The rules provide straightfor-
ward methods of preventing disclosure to persons not involved in the
lawsuit. The rules, however, provide little guidance for courts and
practitioners in resolving the unique problems created by cases be-
tween competitors.
IV. PROTECrING TRADE SECRETS DURING LITIGATION
A. Protection from the General Public
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow protective orders to
be issued to protect trade secrets. The Federal Rules expressly pro-
vide that a district court may issue a protective order "that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial in-
formation not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way."'42 The Federal Rules designate no specific factors for courts to
consider in deciding whether a trade secret should be disclosed, place
no burden on the courts for protecting trade secrets, and fail to state
41. See MrcHAL. A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECrUAL PRoPERTY 116-120 (2d ed. 1991)
(citing E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash and Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 436
(Del. Ch. 1964); Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1985);
Bertotti v. C.E. Shephard Co. Inc., 752 S.W.2d 648, 655 (rex. Ct. App. 1988); American Can
Co. v. Mansukhani, 621 F.Supp. 111, 112-13 (E.D. Wis. 1985); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, No.
84-C-1676 slip op. at 11 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 1986); National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker
Chem. Corp., 530 A2d. 31, 32-33 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 1987); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F.Supp. 645,654 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Standard Brands,
Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 261 (E.D. La. 1967)).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
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the "designated ways" that courts may restrict the disclosure of trade
secrets. The Federal Rules of Evidence also provide no specific gui-
dance concerning trade secrets.43
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides more guidance than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for drafting protective orders. The
Act states that:
In an action under this Act, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an
alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include grant-
ing protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings,
holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and
ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an
alleged trade secret without prior court approval.44
Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Act places an affirm-
ative duty on courts to preserve trade secrets.
The party seeking a protective order generally has the burden of
showing that the protective order is justified.45 In order to avoid pro-
duction of a purported trade secret, a party must establish that the re-
quested material is a trade secret and that its disclosure may be
harmful.a6 Some courts have allowed an attorney, during an oral
43. But see Advisory Comm. Note to Rejected Rule 508, reprinted in 26 CHARLES ALAN
WiucHT & KEzrHm W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRAcncc & PROCn uR: EvIDENCE 282, 283
(1992) ("The need for accommodation between protecting trade secrets, on the one hand, and
eliciting facts required for full and fair presentation of a case, on the other hand, is apparent.
Whether disclosure should be required depends upon a weighing of the competing interests in-
volved against the background of the total situation, including consideration of such factors as
the dangers of abuse, good faith, adequacy of protective measures, and the availability of other
means of proof.").
44. UNU'. TRADE SEcRrs Acr § 5, 14 U.L.A. 461 (1985) (emphasis added).
45. Landry v. Air Line Pilots Assn Intl AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 435 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7-8 (Ist Cir.
1986); Multi-Core, Inc. v. Southern Water Treatment Co., 139 F.R.D. 262, 263 (D. Mass. 1991);
Johnston Dev. Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 352 (D.NJ.
1990); United States v. Rayle Coal Co., 129 F.R.D. 135, 136 (N.D. W. Va. 1989); UAI Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. Valutech, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 188, 191 (M.D.N.C. 1988); BCI Communication Sys.,
Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154, 159 (N.D. Ala. 1986); Tavoulareas v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 111 F.R.D. 653, 658 (D.D.C. 1986); Cooper v. Welch Foods, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 4,
6 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
46. Friction Div. Prods., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998, 1006
(D. Del.), affd, 883 F.2d 1027 (1987); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,
292 (D. Del. 1985); Cutler v. Lewiston Daily Sun, 105 F.R.D. 137, 140 (D. Me. 1985). See also
Duracell, Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 576, 578 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 122 F.R.D. 580, 582 (D. Or. 1988); Byrnes v. Jetnet Corp., 111 F.R.D. 68, 73
(M.D.N.C. 1986).
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deposition, to instruct a witness not to answer because a question
seeks trade secrets or other privileged information. 7
Courts also may order that the record be sealed to prevent disclo-
sure to the general public. Parties must comply with the requirements
of the protective order, or they may disclose a trade secret in a court
filing.4"
Courts may appoint special masters49 to determine discovery dis-
putes concerning trade secrets. In addition to the expressly enumer-
ated methods, the official comment to the Act notes that courts also
have restricted disclosures to a party's counsel and his or her assistants
and have appointed a disinterested expert as a special master to hear
secret information and report conclusions to the court.50 Courts have
broad discretion concerning the powers of a master.5 ' Courts have
referred discovery disputes concerning trade secrets to special mas-
ters.5 2 In many cases, the judge may be unable to determine whether a
list of purported trade secrets is sufficient because the judge may not
understand the technological terms. Of course, if the special master is
47. See, e.g., American Hangar, Inc. v. Basic Line, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 173, 175 (D. Mass.
1985) (The attorney, however, subsequently must seek a protective order.). See also Hisaw v.
Unisys Corp., 134 F.R.D. 151, 152 (W.D. La. 1991); Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Atwell, Vogel & Ster-
ling, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 504,508 (W.D. La. 1988); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D.
545 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (attorney-client and work product privilege).
48. See DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 32 § 1.24,41 ("One law firm forgot to stamp and seal
its client's trade secrets when a pleading was filed. A trade journal monitoring the lawsuit then
published the secrets.").
49. FnD. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
50. Umr. T.ADE Sacanrs Acr § 5 cmt, 14 U.L.A. 461 (1985).
51. The Federal Rules provide that:
The order of reference to the master may specify or limit the master's powers and
may direct the master to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master
has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing
before the master and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for
the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order. The master may
require the production before the master of evidence upon all matters embraced in
the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents,
and writings applicable thereto. The master may rule upon the admissibility of
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the authority
to put witnesses on oath and may examine them and may call the parties to the
action and examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall
make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and
subject to the same limitations as provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence for a
court sitting without a jury.
FED. R. Civ. R. 53(c).
52. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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a member of the industry, then the parties may view the master as a
potential competitor, which may chill meritorious trade secret
litigation.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.," the United States
Supreme Court noted that American courts operate pursuant to a pre-
sumption that the general public has a right to inspect public records
and documents. 4 American courts encompass within that right judi-
cial records and documents." Unlike the British courts,56 American
courts do not require a proprietary interest in the document or a need
for the document as evidence in a lawsuit for asserting the right. 7
The Nixon court, however, also wrote "that the right to inspect
and copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory
power over its own records and files, and access has been denied
where court files might have become a vehicle for improper pur-
poses. ' 58 In addition to divorce cases 59 and suits involving libelous
statements,6 the Nixon court noted that the "courts have refused to
permit their files to serve as... sources of business information that
53. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
54. Id. at 597 n.7 (citing McCoy v. Providence J. Co., 190 F.2d 760, 765-66 (1st Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951); Fayette County v. Martin, 130 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Ky.
1939); Nowack v. Auditor Gen., 219 N.W. 749, 750 (Mich. 1928); In re Egan, 98 N.E. 467, 469
(N.Y. 1912); State ex rel. Nev. Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Grimes, 84 P. 1061, 1072-74 (Nev.
1906); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 303-06 (1882); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 181
N.E.2d 376, 378 (Il1. 1962); ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 116, § 43.7 (1975)).
55. Id. at 598 n. 8 (citing Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504 (C.C. Colo.
1902); In re Sackett, 136 F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1943); C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717,724-27 (Del. 1974);
State ex rel. Williston Herald, Inc. v. O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758,762-63 (N.D. 1967); Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915); Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App.D.C. 404 (1894); United States v.
Burkea, 289 A.2d 376 (D.C. App. 1972)). See also United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708
(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302,
303-04 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Continental I1l. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d
1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (1lth Cir. 1983); Belo
Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Nat'l. Broadcasting Co.,
653 F.2d 609, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
56. IL at 597 (citing Browne v. Cumming, 10 B.&.C. 70, 109 Eng.Rep. 377 (K.B. 1829)).
57. Id.
58. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. Other courts have noted that courts have discretion concerning
court records. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); Crystal Growers
Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. ("The common-law right of inspection has bowed before the power of a court to
insure that its records are not 'used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal through the
publication of the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.") (quoting In re
Caswell, 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893); quoting C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723, 727 (Del. 1974); King v.
King, 168 P. 730 (Wyo. 1917).
60. Id. (citing Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 731,734-35 (Mich. 1888); Cowley
v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 395 (1884); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 48 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (1944);
Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 61 N.E.2d 5, 6 (Mass. 1945)).
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might harm a litigant's competitive standing."6 The Nixon court re-
fused to delineate the parameters on the public's right of access. 62
The Nixon decision also only considered public access to confidential
documents filed with the court rather than a private litigant's access to
an adverse party's confidential materials.
B. Protecting Trade Secrets From Parties to the Litigation
In addition to the methods expressly outlined by statute,' courts
have issued creative protective orders to preserve the confidentiality of
trade secrets. Many courts have required a specification of the trade
secrets and the identification of the method for the misappropriation.
Other courts have deferred trade secret discovery to better protect the
party. Still other courts have required proving, or making some fac-
tual showing of, a misappropriation before ordering disclosure of trade
secrets. The existence of a trade secret may determine the scope of
relevant discovery requests.
1. Specification Of The Trade Secrets And Identification
Of The Method for the Misappropriation
Some courts have required parties alleging a misappropriation of
trade secrets to identify two items: the specific trade secret that alleg-
edly has been misappropriated and the misappropriation. If a plaintiff
has filed an unmeritorious lawsuit, then this approach prevents him or
her from using the legal system to learn a competitor's trade secrets.
Such an approach is similar to the production of a privileged docu-
ment log that lists all attorney-client and work-product documents
before requiring their production.
In Struthers Scientiflc & International Corp. v. General Foods
Corp.,63 the court required a party to identify the specific trade secrets
that had allegedly been misappropriated before allowing discovery of
the defendant's trade secrets. At an earlier hearing the court in
Struthers required a listing of confidential information.'
61. Id. (citing Schmedding v. May, 48 N.W. 201,202 (Mich. 1891); Flexmir, Inc. v. Her-
man, 40 A.2d 799, 800 (NJ. Ch. 1945)).
62. Id. at 599.
63. 51 F.R.D. 149 (D. Del. 1970) (The Struthers court focused on the validity and infringe-
ment of six patents.).
64. The court had ruled that:
The Court is unable pending further clarification and study of the present record
to conclude that Struthers should be able to delve into plaintiff's [General
Foods'] confidential industrial processes and operations without restriction on the
scope of inquiry until the Court is satisfied that there has been an adequate de-
lineation or particularization of the disclosures of the confidential information -
including inventions, trade secrets, know-how and technology - that Struthers
19941
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The Struthers court first focused on the sufficiency of the specifi-
cation of trade secrets. Struthers and General Foods disputed whether
Struthers had specified any trade secrets as opposed to specifying pub-
lic information." The Struthers court made no determination con-
cerning whether the specified items constitute trade secrets.
Compliance with this portion of the Struthers decision merely
requires preparation of a list that may include trade secrets or public
information. By merely requiring the creation of a trade secrets list,
the Struthers decision affords no protection regarding the contents of
that list.
After determining that the trade secrets must be specified on a
list, the Struthers court then addressed the specification of the method
of the misappropriation. The Struthers court required Struthers to
specify whether any of its trade secrets were disclosed by the exten-
sive discovery66 already had before continuing with additional discov-
ery.6 7 The Struthers court then limited discovery to the identified
misappropriations. In Struthers, it was undisputed that Struthers
sought discovery of relevant information.68 The Struthers court re-
quired clarification of the trade secret and the identification of misap-
propriated trade secrets from previously produced documents "before
Struthers discovery under its motion takes place."69 The Struthers
court limited discovery "to those specific trade secrets which it
[Struthers] claims were disclosed to General Foods."70
In Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.,71 the
court similarly required Xerox to identify the specific trade secrets
alleges were made to General Foods pursuant to a confidential relationship be-
tween the parties.
Id. at 152.
65. Struthers had provided a 54-page list containing 103 separate items, sworn to be trade
secrets that it disclosed to General Foods. Struthers purported "to identify the persons who made
the disclosures, the persons to whom they were disclosed and the time period and means of
disclosure." Id. General Foods responded that "the present answer is a sham because it charac-
terizes a mishmash of obviously public information as Struthers trade secrets." Id. The
Struthers court wrote that it "cannot on any valid basis, from its own knowledge or otherwise, at
this time determine whether or not the 103 separate items of information listed in the answer are
bona fide trade secrets of Struthers. To rule on these questions now would require a fullblown
hearing on each separate item." Id. The Struthers court concluded that "Struthers answer is
responsive in specifying separate items of information alleged to be trade secrets." Id. at 153.
66. The Struthers court noted that Struthers had acquired a mass of information regarding
General Foods commercial operations and had deposed more than twenty General Foods wit-
nesses. Id.
67. Id. at 154.
68. Struthers, 51 F.R.D. at 154.
69. Id.
70. Md.
71. 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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that it alleged IBM had misappropriated. In resolving various discov-
ery disputes,72 a special master required Xerox "to furnish to counsel
for IBM and to the Special Master a list of those documents, whether
or not previously furnished to IBM, which contain or comprise the
data and information claimed to be confidential information or trade
secrets and which form the bases of the Xerox claims. '73 The Xerox
court wrote that "[b]ecause Xerox's list refers to documents in their
entirety and not to the specific information contained therein, IBM
wants Xerox to specify which of the information contained, referred
to, or incorporated by reference in these documents are the trade
secrets or confidential information alleged by Xerox to have been mis-
appropriated by IBM."7 4
Like the Struthers court, the Xerox court required specification of
the trade secrets that allegedly had been misappropriated, and the es-
tablishment of a link between specific documents and the allegedly
misappropriated trade secrets. The Xerox court found that:
[A] defendant is entitled to know the bases for plaintiff's charges
against it. The burden is upon the plaintiff to specify those charges,
not upon the defendant to guess at what they are. Thus, after nearly
a year of pre-trial discovery, Xerox should be able to identify in
detail the trade secrets and confidential information alleged to have
been misappropriated by IBM. Clearly until this is done, neither
the court nor the parties can know, with any degree of certainty,
whether discovery is relevant or not; and it is doubtful whether
Xerox can undertake a meaningful discovery program, which in-
cludes its attempt to trace the flow of trade secrets and confidential
information through IBM, without first identifying which trade
secrets and what confidential information IBM has
misappropriated. 75
The Xerox court specifically ordered that Xerox shall:
(1) identify in detail all trade secrets and confidential information
alleged to have been misappropriated by IBM;
(2) list all documents which contain, refer to, or incorporate by
reference Xerox trade secrets or confidential information; and
72. The special master in Xerox identified four discovery problems: the production of doc-
uments previously produced to the FrC and the SCM Corporation, deposition questions involv-
ing allegedly confidential information, the application of an order, and production of certain
notes. Id. at 369.
73. Id. at 370.
74. Id. at 371.
75. Id at 371-72.
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(3) key all documents or portions thereof to the specific trade
secrets and confidential information alleged to have been misappro-
priated by IBM.76
Based on the Xerox and Struthers decisions, parties may be re-
quired to identify the specific trade secrets and documents that they
allege have been misappropriated before conducting discovery of the
opposing party's trade secrets. Parties may be required to list all doc-
uments from the opposing party's confidential document log that con-
tain, refer to, or incorporate their trade secrets. Parties also may be
required to explain the connection between each document and the
specific trade secret.
In Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp.,7' the court also required the
plaintiff to identify the specific trade secret before discovering defend-
ants trade secrets. The Engelhard court found that:
Where, as here, a plaintiff in a trade secret case seeks to discover
the trade secrets and confidential proprietary information of its ad-
versary, the plaintiff will normally be required first to identify with
reasonable particularity the matter which it claims constitutes a
trade secret, before it will be allowed (given a proper showing of
need) to compel discovery of its adversarys trade secrets.78
The Engelhard court further wrote that "the purpose of the require-
ment is to clarify the issues involved in the dispute so as to assure that
there will be no disclosure of an adversary litigant's trade secrets be-
yond what is necessary for the prosecution of the litigation. 79
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp.,s0 the district court
also required the plaintiff to identify the allegedly misappropriated
trade secrets. The plaintiff in Litton resisted providing a specific trade
secret list."1 The parties disagreed "whether Litton ever specified any
76. Xerox, 64 F.R.D. at 372.
77. 505 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1986).
78. Id. at 33 (citing Data General Corp. v. SCI Systems, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 5662,
Brown, V.C. (November 27, 1978); Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64
F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Struthers Scientific & Int. Corp. v. General Foods Corp.,
51 F.R.D. 149, 154 (D. Del. 1970)).
The Engelhard court refused to allow any delay in providing the list identifying the pur-
ported trade secrets. Engelhard agreed to provide a "trade secret statement," but argued "that
Savin should not be permitted access to the contents of that trade secret statement for 90 days,
during which time Engelhard would take its discovery, albeit in a somewhat pared down form."
Id. In rejecting that argument, the Engelhard court wrote that such a proposal "would defeat the
very purpose of the trade secret disclosure requirement, which is to enable the parties, and, if
necessary, the Court, to determine the outside parameters of discovery." Id.
79. IM.
80. 750 F.2d 952 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
81. In Litton, the plaintiff contended that "it would take eight months to list its thousands
of secrets. The district court twice ordered Litton to identify its trade secrets." Id. at 954.
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trade secrets, and if it did, whether they numbered 2, 6, or 17. '"82
Though the Litton decision leaves unclear whether Litton provided a
more specific list, the Litton court affirmed the district court's denial
of Litton's motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolution of the
temporary restraining order.
In AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker,s3 the court rejected a claim of
unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets in an action
against a former employee and a corporate competitor. After a trial on
the merits, the district court denied AMP's requested injunctive relief,
and issued a clarifying order "that AMP had demonstrated the exist-
ence of 'protectible business secrets.' "I' In considering the appeal, 85
the AMP court noted that:
AMP has consistently failed throughout this litigation to identify
any particularized trade secrets actually at risk. Prior to trial, AMP
submitted six single-spaced, typewritten pages listing by general
item and category hundreds of pieces of AMP internal information.
Other courts have warned plaintiffs of the risks they run by failing
to identify specific trade secrets and instead producing long lists of
general -areas of information which contain unidentified trade
secrets.86
The AMP court further stated that, "[iln its principal brief to this
Court, AMP has again refused to specify precisely what trade secrets
it believes to be at risk by identifying particular documents or other
sources of information, relying on its by now familiar refrain that Mr.
Fleischhacker has misappropriated 'confidential business and techni-
cal information.' ,87
Because of the failure to identify specific trade secrets, the AMP
court found against AMP. The AMP court held that "the district court
erred as a matter of law when it held that the general confidential
information identified by AMP constituted protectible business
secrets."88 The AMP court explained that "Illinois courts have not
82. Id.
83. 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 1203. The district court further ruled that "no relief was warranted because AMP
had not shown any likelihood that Mr. Fleischhacker would compromise any of the information
known to him." Id.
85. On appeal, AMP argued that the district court's clarifying order "precludes the defend-
ants from contesting the existence of trade secrets and that under Illinois law irreparable harm is
presumed to follow if a protectible interest is not protected." Id
86. Id at 1203 (citing Litton Systems, Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952,954, 956-57
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
87. Id. The AMP court also noted that "[a]t oral argument AMP finally attempted to
identify three specific documents allegedly authored by Mr. Fleischhacker which contained trade
secret information at risk of misappropriation. Such argument comes too late." Id. at 1203 n.2.
88. AMP, 823 F.2d at 1203.
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extended protection under the common law of trade secrets to the kind
of generalized confidential business information on which AMP
relies."89
In Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 0 the
court required a listing of allegedly misappropriated trade secrets and
efforts to maintain their confidentiality. The Leucadia court "ordered
Leucadia to furnish AET sufficient details of its trade secrets, upon
entry of an appropriate protective order, to enable AET to identify the
information Leucadia claims was misappropriated."'" Leucadia pro-
duced under seal an "itemization of trade secrets and list of measures
used to protect the secrets."92 AET asserted "that Leucadia's list still
does not adequately identify the trade secrets at issue or the measures
Leucadia used to protect them." 93 The Leucadia court "postponed
Leucadia's discovery of AET to permit AET to conduct discovery of
Leucadia to ascertain the trade secrets which AET allegedly
misappropriated."'94
In Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm,9" the court sanctioned a plaintiff
for evasive responses to interrogatories seeking specific identification
of allegedly misappropriated trade secrets. 96 The defendant in Croma-
glass had served four interrogatories requesting identification of the
"confidential and specialized knowledge and information" referred to
in the complaint.97 The Cromaglass court ordered the plaintiff and its
attorney to pay the defendant's reasonable expenses. 98 Though the
89. Id. at 1204.
90. 755 F. Supp. 635 (D. Del. 1991) (The Leucadia court considered a claim for injunctive
relief and damages).
91. Id. at 636.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 344 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Pa. 1972), appeal dismissed, 500 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 926.
97. The plaintiff Cromaglass identified the information requested as:
Mhat information accumulated by plaintiff and its predecessor at great cost and
expense pertaining to all of the materials, and suppliers thereof, utilized in the
fabrication of aerobic sewage treatment equipment and to the names and ad-
dresses of customers and potential customers, dealers and distributors and health
department officials, all accumulated at great cost and expense to plaintiff during
the period of employment of Carl Ferm by [pilaintiff and plaintiff's predecessor.
Id. at 926.
The other interrogatory responses referred to that response. The Cromaglass court, there-
fore, found that "Plaintiff's answers to Interrogatories ... are wholly evasive and nonrespon-
sive." Id. at 927. The Cromaglass court further found "that $4,000.00 constitutes reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure of Plaintiff to answer the interrogato-
ries." Id. at 928.
98. Id. at 928.
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Cromaglass court only issued a monetary sanction, it mentioned the
possibility of dismissing the action. 9
In Uresil Corp. v. Cook Group, Inc.,"°° the court considered the
sufficiency of interrogatory responses concerning experts in a trade
secrets dispute.10 The Uresil court wrote that "the term 'summary of
the grounds for each opinion' [used in the expert interrogatories]
speaks to the reasons or rationale behind the opinions and not to
merely a recitation of documents or general statement of the expert's
intended testimony."'1 2 After reviewing the interrogatory responses,
the Uresil court found that "the answers furnished by Uresil are very
general in nature containing broad, open-ended technical statements";
"that it is impossible for a reader of these answers to ascertain any of
the specifics to which Uresil's experts will testify or from where
Uresil's expert witnesses derived their conclusions"; that "Uresil's an-
swers are evasive and repetitive and, most importantly, without expla-
nation of the basis for any of the expert witnesses' theories"; and "that
the answers do not adequately specify which products the expert wit-
nesses' answers address.' 10 3
The Uresil court required a high level of specificity. Although
some of Uresil's interrogatory responses provided references to spe-
99. Id. at 927.
100. 135 F.R.D. 168 (N.D. 111. 1991) (The parties in Uresil competed in the design, manu-
facture and sale of medical catheters.).
101. "Cook argues that Uresil's responses to the expert witnesses' interrogatories it pro-
pounded were insufficient and therefore should either be stricken or it should be permitted to
depose the experts prior to trial." Id. at 170.
102. IdM at 172. The Uresil court further wrote that:
[I]n order to sufficiently answer expert witness interrogatories one must provide,
the theories which the experts will use when testifying, a precise statement of the
subject matter upon which the answer is based, an explanation of the terms used
by the expert, and the rationale or reasons behind the expert's answers. All of this
information must be furnished keeping in mind the underlying purpose of inter-
rogatories: to allow the opposing party to prepare a rebuttal or cross-examination
of the testimony presented.
Id. at 173.
103. Id. The Uresil court provided specific examples of deficient interrogatory responses.
The Uresil court noted that, "The answers for all of Uresil's experts state that each 'is prepared
to evaluate the Cook catheters in relation to the Uresil products that are involved in the instant
case.'" Id.
The Uresil court found three defects in that response:
First, we are left with no specifics in understanding the generality "to evaluate...
in relation to." Next, to be sufficient, Uresil must at least identify which of Cooks
[sic] catheters will be evaluated, as well as the particular aspects of those cathe-
ters, that will be evaluated by Uresil's expert witnesses. Additionally, Uresil's
answers are found deficient in their identification of which of Uresil's products
will be evaluated in relation to Cook's catheters.
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cific products, the Uresil court found that those answers also were too
vague and general." The Uresil court emphasized two particular re-
sponses to interrogatories related to the misappropriation claims.
First, the Uresil court noted that:
Uresil has not identified the components and/or concepts incorpo-
rated in the products Uresil claims Cook misappropriated. Nor
does Uresil identify all information and documents alleged by
Uresil to be confidential and to have been misappropriated by the
defendant. It must so indicate whether there are or not such infor-
mation or documents.105
The Uresil court also noted that "Uresil has failed to identify any of
Cook's agents who entered into an agreement or 'acknowledged an
agreement' limiting Cook's use of information obtained from
Uresil."'1 6 The Uresil court ordered Uresil to make its expert wit-
nesses available for deposition within 45 days of the order or for those
witnesses to be barred from testifying. It further ordered Uresil to
supplement its response to the two referenced interrogatories. 10 7
The existence of a trade secret, and its specific designation, may
determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the issue. In Gabriel
International, Inc. v. M & D Industries of Louisiana, Inc.,01s the court
found that the court's jurisdiction depends on the existence of a trade
secret. The plaintiff in Gabriel had filed an action for damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to Louisiana's Uniform Trade Secret Act. 109
The Gabriel court found that "there was absolutely no evidence or
affidavit attached [to the complaint] to support plaintiff's allegation
104. For example, for certain experts, Uresil responded that their experts "will testify to the
uniqueness of the Uresil endoscopy balloons and the similarities of the Cook tamponade bal-
loons." Id. The Uresil court found that "Uresil totally fails to indicate what its experts mean by
the term 'uniqueness' in relation to the 'endoscopy balloons' and exactly to which similarities of
the Cook tamponade balloons they are referring." Id. The Uresil court further noted that re-
sponses for other experts indicated that "each [expert] will 'testify about the Uresil central ve-
nous hyperalimenation catheters.. ." Id. The Uresil court wrote that:
It is unclear what the phrase "testify about" means, thus essentially making this an
inadequate answer having within it no statement of the grounds, basis, or reasons
to form the necessary degree of disclosure contemplated by the rules. Uresil fur-
ther fails to explain the open ended statement, in the context of a sufficient an-
swer, what it referred to "as to the merits of Uresil research and development as
they relate to these products and as they relate to the Uresil/Cook controversy."
How Cook could discern the substance of the fact or opinions to which an expert
is expected to testify, as contained in such an answer, is anybody's guess.
Id.
105. Uresil, 135 F.R.D. at 174.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 174-75.
108. 719 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. La. 1989).
109. Id
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that a trade secret or secrets existed or that the plaintiff was the owner
thereof." 110 The Gabriel court rejected plaintiff's argument "that the
trade secret issue is an issue of fact which should be submitted to and
decided only by jury and that it is inappropriate that it be submitted to
the Court for decision.""' The Gabriel court found that:
[Iff a trade secret or secrets exist and that plaintiff is the owner, the
plaintiff necessarily, and without the need to resort to depositions,
interrogatories or any other form of discovery is now in a position
to present in secrecy the evidence required to determine that a trade
secret or secrets exist and that plaintiff is the owner thereof. 12
The Gabriel court ruled that the "[p]laintiff must be the owner of a
trade secret or secrets. This is a jurisdictional limitation inherent in
the statute."' " 3
In Miles, Inc. v. Cookson America, Inc.," 4 the court considered
discovery requests concerning trade secrets that had allegedly been
misappropriated. One of the parties "submitted with its motion to
compel a 'Statement of Miles' Trade Secrets,' a document generally
outlining the processes that Miles utilizes in producing the pigments at
issue.""' 5 The Miles court wrote that the "motion to compel discovery
must be granted because its Statement of Trade Secrets sets forth with
'reasonable particularity' the processes it claims are the trade secrets
that Cookson misappropriated."' " 6
2. Deferring Discovery Of Trade Secrets
In Ray v. Allied Chemical Corp.," 7 the court provided a detailed
analysis concerning discovery of trade secrets. The Ray court ruled
that "the issue of discovery of processes, whether by interrogatories or
otherwise, should be deferred until the trial, to be resolved by the Trial
Judge who would be in a better position to evaluate plaintiff's
claim.""' 8 The Ray court ultimately held that "the motion [to vacate
certain interrogatories] of the defendant is granted to the extent of
110. Id. at 523.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gabriel, 719 F. Supp. at 523. The Gabriel court ordered an evidentiary hearing re-
garding the existence of a trade secret before ruling on defendant's Motion for Protective Order.
Id. at 525.
114. No. 12,310, 1992 WL 136381 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1992).
115. Id. at *1.
116. Il
117. 34 F.R.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
118. Id. at 457. See also Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 55 F.R.D.
491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1970) ("This Court is in accord with the principle enunciated by Judge
Weinfield in [the Ray] case. This Court recognizes, however, that if the interests of all parties
1994]
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deferring consideration of the question of disclosure of secret
processes by the defendant or its employees until the trial, at which
time the substance of plaintiffs contention may more appropriately be
determined."" 9 The Ray court further ordered the defendant "to pre-
pare and collate, sufficiently in advance of trial, all the material and
data in answer to the propounded interrogatories so that in the event
they should be upheld or other discovery permitted by the Trial Judge
the answers will be readily available and thus delay will be kept to a
minimum." '12o
In many cases, deferring consideration of trade secrets discovery
until the time of trial may not be a feasible option. Trade secret objec-
tions and related instructions to not answer may render depositions of
fact and expert witnesses virtually useless. The facts often depend on
the existence of trade secrets. Without a prior ruling on the trade
secrets issues, the parties may be unable to prepare for trial.
In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,12 1
the court allowed discovery of non-confidential documents before
confidential documents. The Marrese court noted that courts "must
compare the hardship to the party against whom discovery is sought, if
discovery is allowed, with the hardship to the party seeking discovery
if discovery is denied."' 22 The Marrese court also wrote that:
[O]bviously an order merely postponing a particular discovery re-
quest should be granted more freely than an order denying the re-
quest altogether. The hardship to the party seeking discovery is
less if he is just being told to complete his other discovery first (or
just to let the other party have some discovery first) than if he is
being told to do without forever. 23
The Marrese court further wrote that:
If there is other discovery that the plaintiffs must complete in order
to be able to resist a motion by the defendant for summary judg-
ment, and thus a significant chance that the plaintiffs' case will fail
are to be properly protected, discovery should be granted. Fortunately, Federal Rule 26(c) gives
the Court much leeway in effecting a protective order.").
119. Id. at 458.
120. Id.
121. 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), appeal after remand, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Though the Marrese decision did not involve an allegation of mis-
appropriation of trade secrets, it considered a similar discovery dispute. In Marrese, two ortho-
pedic surgeons filed an antitrust action against a private association because they were denied
membership. In particular, the defendant refused to produce confidential documents relating to
denials of membership applications, and the district court held the defendant in criminal
contempt.
122. Id. at 1493.
123. Id.
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regardless of what the internal files that they are seeking may show,
the district judge should use his power under Rule 26(d) to require
the plaintiffs to complete the other, nonsensitive discovery first.124
The Marrese court concluded that:
The power granted by Rule 26(d) to control the sequence and tim-
ing of discovery is one of the district courts' too little used tools for
preventing the predatory abuse of discovery and we are at a loss to
understand why the power was not used here. "[J]udges should
not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery
process."'125
The Marrese decision offers helpful policy arguments. Discov-
ery of a party's trade secrets often imposes a significant hardship. The
hardship to the requesting party from delaying its discovery obviously
would be less than foregoing discovery altogether.
A court may avoid disclosure of trade secrets by bifurcating the
case between liability and damages and initially restrict discovery to
liability. In Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp.,126
the court considered liability before ordering disclosure of trade
secrets concerning damages. The Self Directed court found that:
Self Directed's pending motion to compel production of documents
was related solely to the issue of damages. The district court's or-
der granting summary judgment for Control Data was rendered on
liability. Additional information regarding damages would not
have altered the district court's finding of no liability. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on Control
Data's liability before discovery was completed. 127
At least one court has ruled against bifurcating discovery in a
misappropriation of trade secrets case. In Microtech International,
Inc. v. Fair, 1 21 the court considered a motion to compel and a motion
124. Id. at 1494. Rule 26(d) provides that:
Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any
sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition
or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any party's discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
125. Marrese, 706 F.2d at 1495 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979)). The
Marrese court ultimately reversed the criminal contempt judgment. Id. at 1497-98.
126. 908 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1990). In Self Directed, the district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment while plaintiff claimed adequate discovery was not permitted
before the summary judgment was heard. Id. at 463.
127. Id. at 465 (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
128. No. 32-83-08, 1992 WL 239087 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
Microtech alleged that its former employee misappropriated its "customer account names,
pricing and marketing strategies, and product information." Id. at *1.
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for a protective order concerning "documents relating to customer
contacts and product sales made by the defendant as an employee with
Loviel Computer Corporation ("Loviel") [apparently a competitor of
Microtech] after leaving the plaintiff's employment." The former em-
ployee claimed that an agreement with his current employer barred
him from disclosing the information, and that he would be subject to
civil liability under the Uniform Trade Secret Act for disclosing the
requested information.129 The Microtech court wrote that "plaintiff's
claim for misappropriation of trade secrets necessitates discovery rela-
tive to whether the defendant solicited customers for Loviel by utiliz-
ing confidential information he obtained while in the employ of the
plaintiff."'130 The defendant in Microtech requested a protective order
precluding "further inquiry into matters that are relevant only to dam-
ages until a later point in time when the plaintiff first can show that
the defendant has engaged in wrongdoing"; and precluding discovery
of "customer specific information of the defendant [and] his em-
ployer until the plaintiff first can show probable cause that the defend-
ant has engaged in wrongdoing."' 31
The Microtech court refused to grant the protective orders. The
Microtech court wrote that, "Both of these proposed protective orders
disregard the fact that in order for the plaintiff to demonstrate any
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff must first dis-
cover the very information which the defendant seeks to preclude."" 2
The Microtech court further wrote that:
Thus, the plaintiff's discovery requests, related as they are to the
defendant's conduct in the solicitation of customers shared by the
plaintiff and the defendant's employer, do not merely affect the
amount of damages that may be recouped in the plaintiffs action,
but rather, bear directly upon the issue of wrongdoing raised by the
plaintiffs claim. 133
The Microtech court entered a protective order concerning disclosures
to the public, but denied defendant's other requested relief.13 4
129. Id. (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51).
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id.
133. Microtech, No. 32-83-08, 1992 WL 239087 at *3.
134. Id. ("Therefore, the defendant's motion for protective order is granted only to the ex-
tent that any discovery is to be conducted in private with only those persons involved in the
litigation being present, the court file in this case is ordered sealed, and any person involved in
this litigation is not to disclose any alleged trade secret without prior court approval.").
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3. Requiring Some Factual Showing Before Permitting
Discovery
In Microwave Research Corp. v. Sanders Associates, Inc.,' 35 the
court required a substantial factual showing of misappropriation
before permitting discovery of trade secrets.136 The Microwave court
wrote that:
[W]hen discovery of a defendant's alleged trade secrets and confi-
dential information is sought in litigation regarding misappropria-
tion by a defendant of a plaintiff's trade secrets or confidential
information, it is not enough to analyze the requested discovery in
terms of relevance. In order to protect a corporate defendant from
having to reveal its trade secrets and confidential information to a
competitor during discovery, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there
is a factual basis for its claim. 137
The Microwave court specifically rejected the approaches taken by the
Ray, Marrese, and Xerox courts.' 31
The Microwave court set forth a standard for discovery of trade
secrets. In particular, the Microwave court ruled that:
In these circumstances, when a plaintiff cannot specify the trade
secrets and/or confidential information which it claims were misap-
propriated, the test of whether or not such a plaintiff is entitled to
the kind of broad discovery which Microwave seeks in the instant
case... is whether there is a substantial factual basis for plaintiffs
claim that the defendant has misappropriated its trade secrets. 139
The Microwave court further ruled that meeting the test "requires
something more than what is required in order to file a count alleging
misappropriation of trade secrets."' n0 The Microwave court noted that
to file a misappropriation of trade secrets claim, a party must only
have a "belief' which is "well-grounded in fact" that trade secrets
have been misappropriated.' 4 1 The Microwave court further wrote
135. 110 F.R.D. 669 (D. Mass. 1986).
136. The Microwave court specifically considered the issue "in what circumstances can a
corporate plaintiff, which alleges misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information,
obtain discovery of trade secrets and confidential information of a corporate defendant in order
to discover whether or not any of the corporate plaintiff's trade secrets have been appropriated
and used by the corporate defendant." Id. at 670. The Microwave court found that the requested
discovery was relevant to the claim. Id. at 672.
137. Id. at 672.
138. Id. at 672-73 (citing Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1494 (7th Cir. 1983)
and Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
139. Id. at 674.
140. Microwave, 110 F.R.D. at 674.
141. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
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that "before a plaintiff is entitled to the type of broad discovery into a
defendant's trade secrets, it must show that other evidence which it
has gathered through discovery provides a substantial factual basis for
its claim."' 42
The Microwave court favored two possible methods for making a
substantial factual showing of a misappropriation under the facts of
the case. First, a plaintiff may rely on depositions of the defendant's
employees and affidavits of the plaintiff's employees. The Micro-
wave court wrote that:
While a plaintiff is not required to accept testimony of a defend-
ant's employees that they did not misappropriate any confidential
information and/or trade secrets, it would seem that the plaintiff,
after interviewing its own employees and deposing [defendant's]
employees, would be able to point to some circumstances which
would support an inference that [defendant's] employees were in-
terested in obtaining confidential information for purposes of
misappropriation. 143
The Microwave court also noted that an inference of misappropri-
ation may be shown by a comparison of the products. The Microwave
court wrote that:
[Plaintiff] has received discovery regarding [defendant's] prod-
ucts which compete with those which [plaintiff] produces. Yet
[plaintiff] has been unable to point to any inclusion of its trade
secrets or confidential information in any of those products. It
would seem that if trade secrets were misappropriated, some would
be found in [defendant's] products which compete with [plain-
tiff's] products. But [plaintiff] is not able to point to anything in
[defendant's] products with which it competes which would indi-
cate that any trade secrets have been misappropriated. 144
The Microwave court ultimately found that "plaintiff has not demon-
strated that there is a substantial factual basis for its claims of misap-
propriation of trade secrets and/or confidential information."1 45
In Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Pruitt,146 the court considered
whether to allow the deposition of William Zimmerman, an employee
of Nitrous Oxide Corporation, a non-party and Puritan-Bennett's (P-
B's) only competitor. 47 The Puritan-Bennett court relied on the Mi-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 674-75.
144. Id. at 675.
145. Microwave, 110 F.R.D. at 675.
146. 142 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
147. The Puritan-Bennett court originally quashed the deposition subpoena. The Puritan-
Bennett court specifically considered three motions: Puritan-Bennett's Motion to Reconsider, the
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crowave decision in writing that "the party seeking discovery of trade
secrets from another must first provide a substantial factual basis for
its claim."' 48 The Puritan-Bennett court further wrote that:
Thus, it is incumbent upon P-B to make a showing that there is a
substantial basis for its claim. If this can be done, discovery should
be denied unless P-B establishes the relevance of the trade secrets it
seeks to inquire into of Nitrous Oxide Corporation, P-B demon-
strates a true need for the information, and P-B establishes that the
potential harm to Nitrous Oxide Corporation is outweighed by
P-B's need for discovery.
149
The Puritan-Bennett court found that the requested discovery would
require the disclosure by a non-party competitor to disclose trade
secrets.150
The Puritan-Bennett court permitted limited discovery but im-
posed strict limits on Mr. Zimmerman's deposition. It noted that P-B
and Nitrous Oxide Corporation "are the only two manufacturers in the
United States of nitrous oxide-and obviously compete directly and
exclusively with each other for the sales of nitrous oxide. In this re-
gard, most courts recognize that disclosure to one's competition is
more harmful than disclosure to non-competitors."' 1 1 The Puritan-
Bennett court ruled that it would "allow very limited discovery of Ni-
trous Oxide Corporation and William Zimmerman [its employee],
solely related to the statute of limitations question."'152 The Puritan-
Bennett court also ruled, should any questions require the disclosure of
any confidential trade secrets then, that "[n]o representative of P-B
other than its legal counsel will be allowed to attend the deposition";
"the deposition shall remain sealed"; and "[n]either P-B nor counsel
for P-B will be allowed to retain a copy of the deposition."'5 3 The
Puritan-Bennett court explained that:
non-party's Resistance to P-B's Motion to Reconsider, and the non-party's Motion for Protective
Order. Id. at 307.
148. Id. at 308 (citing Microwave Research Corp. v. Sanders Assocs., 110 F.R.D. 669, 674
(D. Mass. 1986)).
149. Id. at 308-09 (citing In re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 1991)).
150. Id. at 310 (The Puritan-Bennett court based this finding largely on the affidavit submit-
ted by the president of the non-party).
151. Puritan-Bennett, 142 F.R.D. at 310 (citing United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d
553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
107 F.R.D. 288, 291 (D. Del. 1985); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. National Castings, Inc., No. 88 C
924, 1988 WL 90022, at I (N.D. Il. Aug. 19, 1988); Duracell, Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., 126
F.R.D. 571,579 (N.D. Ga. 1989); American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, 828 F.2d 734, 739-41 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 29 (E.D. Mich. 1981)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The conditions concerning the deposition of William Zimmerman
are restrictive indeed. This is based upon the court's belief that
disclosure of trade secrets of Nitrous Oxide Corporation to their
only United States competitor, P-B, would have a drastic impact on
their ongoing corporate viability. Given these representations by
Nitrous Oxide Corporation, the court deems the restrictions im-
posed to be the least restrictive method to allow discovery by
P-B.
1 5 4
Courts have repeatedly held that the relevance of requested dis-
covery depends on the existence of a trade secret. Courts may require
a showing of relevance before permitting discovery of trade secrets.
In Automatic Drilling Machines, Inc. v. Miller,155 the court wrote that
"public disclosure of trade secrets should not be required.., except in
such cases and to such extent as may appear to be indispensable for
the ascertainment of truth." '156 The Automatic Drilling court also
wrote that the "information conceivably could be obtained by eliciting
from the witness a description of the secret processes and devices in
terms sufficiently general to protect relator and yet enable respondents
to make further investigation concerning any use to which the new
systems and procedures may have been put." '157 The Automatic Drill-
ing court ruled that the district court "should not have ordered full
disclosure of all the material without first making further inquiry to
determine relevance and need."158
In Lever Bros. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 59 the court
deferred ruling on the discovery request. 16 The Lever court wrote
that "very possibly the decision on the particular point goes to the
heart of the controversy between the parties, at a very preliminary
stage of the case when the court is not adequately informed as to the
154. Id. at 311.
155. 515 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. 1974). The Automatic Drilling court considered a mandamus
action concerning a discovery order in a patent infringement and trade secrets case.
156. Id. at 259 (quoting 8 JoHN HeRy WioMoRE, EvmrENca mN TRALs AT COMMON LAW
§ 2212(3) (1961)).
157. Id. at 260.
158. Id. See also Firestone Photographs Inc. v. Lamaster, 567 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) ("[IThe claim of trade secrets ... even if correct, does not necessarily defeat the
right of discovery. It simply imposes upon the trial court the obligation to weigh the need for
discovery against the desirability for preserving secrecy, and to protect the material from unnec-
essary public disclosure.").
159. 38 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1941).
160. The Lever court considered whether a defendant must disclose its trade secrets in a
patent infringement action between competitors. The Lever court noted that a trade secret "privi-
lege is not absolute but conditioned upon the circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 683.
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ultimate relevancy or materiality of the point in issue." '16 1 The Lever
court also wrote that:
[Tihe refusal to compel present disclosure is not final, because it
may develop at the trial on the merits that the defendants claimed
secret process is both relevant, material and necessary to a decision,
and the defendant's rights, if any, can be very much better safe-
guarded if a decision on the point is reserved until the trial of the
case.
1 6 2
The Lever court ultimately refused to order a witness to answer ques-
tions and refused to require defendant to produce documents at that
time.16
3
In De Long Corp. v. Lucas,' the court considered the discovery
of trade secrets in an action by a company against its former em-
ployee. The De Long court found that:
[IThe injury which can flow to the defendant in the event of a
failure on the part of the plaintiff to sustain its case would be irrep-
arable, for the plaintiff would have learned of the defendant's new
processes and would thus be in a position to adopt these new
methods.
165
The De Long court ruled that:
[I]t would be best to leave the question of the propriety of produc-
tion of these patent applications and other papers relevant to these
applications to the trial judge who can, after the evidence unfolds,
decide whether there is relevancy to the papers. The trial judge can
then grant a brief adjournment and permit inspection if he sees fit.
It seems to me that to grant the discovery of these documents at this
juncture of the case would be to give the plaintiff more than his
action seeks. 166
In International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,'67 the court re-
quired both parties to establish the relevance of its requested discov-
161. Id.
162. l&
163. Id at 684. Accord, Western States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 1 F.R.D. 766,767
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) ("'he rules were undoubtedly intended to make examinations liberal but
where patents and patent infringements are involved, the discretion of the Court should be exer-
cised to prevent disclosure of trade secrets in advance of the trial."); see also Wagner Mfg. Co. v.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 480, 485 (S.D. Ohio 1950) ("[D]efendant should not be re-
quired to disclose what its Vice President swears is a secret process unless and until it should
appear, in the sound discretion of the court that such disclosure is essential to the determination
of the controversy presently before it.").
164. 138 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
165. 1d. at 808-09.
166. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
167. 15 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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ery. In International Nickel, both parties requested "data on the
other's manufacturing processes, but each claim[ed] its own
processes [were] confidential and irrelevant to the action." 168 The
International Nickel court noted that "[s]erious prejudice might well
result if the court required production and revelation of these materi-
als.' 69 The International Nickel court concluded that:
I am hesitant to order such production unless it shall appear to be
necessary for the determination of the merits of the case.
Therefore, I shall deny the motions for such material at this
time and leave the matter open for determination by the trial judge
when it may more clearly appear how much of this production, if
any, is required.170
In Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court,171 the court
required a showing of relevance before requiring disclosure of a trade
secret. The Hartley court wrote that:
[T]he requirements of relevance and necessity must be established
where disclosure of a trade secret is sought whether sought under
Rule 33 or 34, and that the burden rests upon the party seeking
disclosure to establish that the trade secret sought is relevant and
necessary to the prosecution or defense of the case before a court is
justified in ordering disclosure.' 72
The Hartley court found that the requesting party "did not sustain the
burden that rested upon it of establishing that the trade secrets sought
were relevant and necessary to its proper defense of the main ac-
tion."'17 3 The Hartley court ultimately set aside the district court's or-
der without prejudice pending a showing of relevance. 74
In Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. Holden's Foundation
Seeds, Inc., 7s the court required a higher showing of relevance before
allowing discovery from a non-party competitor, Fred Gutwein &
168. IaL at 358.
169. Id.
170. Id (citing Lever Bros. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1941);
Western States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 1 F.R.D. 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); and Wagner
Mfg. Co. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 480,485 (S.D. Ohio 1950)). See also Western Elec.
Co. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 306 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) ("mhe interests of
justice dictate that the issues of validity of the patents, whether plaintiff was entitled to royalties
prior to, and whether there was, a valid termination, be determined before it is decided whether
and to what extent appellant is entitled to disclosure.").
171. 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
172. IR at 331.
173. Id
174. Id
175. 105 F.R.D. 76, 77 (N.D. Ind. 1985). (Pioneer alleged that its hybrid seed corn had
been misappropriated.).
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Sons, Inc. The Pioneer court wrote that, "[d]isclosure of the informa-
tion Pioneer seeks could seriously jeopardize Gutwein's position in
the hybrid seed corn industry."' 76 The Pioneer court further wrote
that, "Pioneer's general, conclusory assertions that the documents and
information it seeks from Gutwein are relevant to this case are not
sufficient in the face of Gutwein's challenges to those assertions."' 77
The Pioneer court explained that "Pioneer must meet a higher stan-
dard. Pioneer must establish that the additional information it wants is
sufficiently relevant and necessary to outweigh the harm disclosure of
the information would cause Gutwein."' 78 The Pioneer court con-
cluded that "Pioneer has not carried this burden."' 79
In Magnox v. Turner,8 ° the court ruled that "the relevance of
[Magnox's discovery] requests cannot be determined until Magnox
identifies the trade secrets that it claims have been misappropriated by
defendant."'' The Magnox court wrote that:
When the subject matter of a suit is a claim of misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, "the plaintiff will normally be required first to
identify with reasonable particularity the matter which it claims
constitutes a trade secret, before it will be allowed (given a proper
showing of need) to compel discovery of its adversary's trade
secrets."'
182
The Magnox court explained that:
The purpose of this requirement is to set the outer boundaries of
discovery in order to avoid the needless exposure of a defendant's
trade secrets. Only after a plaintiff has identified the trade secret
that has allegedly been misappropriated can the relevance, and
therefore the scope, of discovery be determined.' 8 3
176. Id. at 81. The Pioneer court noted that, "Gutwein is particularly concerned about the
possibility that its competitors will learn of its present supplier and customer relationships, which
could be jeopardized if they were disclosed.' Id.
177. Id at 82 (citing Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. District Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961);
Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger, 74 F.R.D. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v.
General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1968)).
178. Id. at 82-83 (citing CHAR.ES A. WmaiGr & ARTHUR R. MmLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 2043, p. 301 (1970)).
179. Id. at 83.
180. No. 11951, 1991 W.L. 182450 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1991).
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id at *1-2 (quoting Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1986);
citing Data General Corp. v. SCI Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 5662-NC, Brown, V.C. (Del. Ch. Nov.
16, 1978)).
183. Id. at *2.
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The Magnox court found that Magnox failed to identify its allegedly
misappropriated trade secrets.' 8 4 The Magnox court, therefore, denied
Magnox's motion to compel.185
The Magnox court also discussed the standards for obtaining a
protective order against disclosure of trade secrets. The Magnox court
noted that after Magnox specifies the allegedly misappropriated trade
secrets, then defendant may seek a protective order.186 The Magnox
court explained that:
In order to obtain a protective order, a defendant must show
that the information the plaintiff seeks is confidential or a trade
secret and that the defendant will be harmed by the disclosure of
that information. If such a showing is made, the burden will then
shift to the plaintiff to show that the information sought is suffi-
ciently relevant and necessary to its case to outweigh any harm
disclosure would cause to the defendant. 187
In concluding that the defendant had failed to meet its burden for a
protective order, the Magnox court wrote that, "It is not sufficient to
merely claim that the information is a trade secret; defendants must
show why such information should be accorded trade secret
protection."' 8
Other courts have refused to follow this approach. In Liberty
Folder v. Curtiss Anthony Corp.,8 9 the court wrote that "the [defend-
ant's] cited authorities do not establish an unalterable rule in that re-
gard, but only indicate that such course was warranted under the facts
presented in each particular case."'90 The Liberty Folder court also
wrote that "unlike Ray, International Nickel, and Lever Bros.,... the
confidential commercial information at issue, herein, is not a secret
process, ingredient or formula, which might be patentable and which
would, therefore, lose value if disclosed at all."'19 1 In Coca-Cola Bot-
184. Id. ("Magnox merely alleges that defendant Turner solicited some of its customers and
that his knowledge of Magnox's confidential proprietary information about customer specifica-
tions put him in the unique position of knowing which competing products to offer those custom-
ers. Magnox, however, has failed to further identify this confidential information.").
185. Magnox, No. 11951, 1991 W.L. 182450 at *2.
186. I.
187. Id. (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 292-93 (D. Del.
1985); CHARLEs A. W~iGrr & ARTHuR R. MILLER, 8 FEDERaLi PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § 2043
(1970)).
188. Ial
189. 90 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
190. Id. at 83 (citing Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456, 457 ($.D.N.Y. 1964);
International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); and Lever
Bros. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp 680, 683-84 (D. Mich. 1941)). The confi-
dential information in Liberty Folder included customer information.
191. Id.
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tling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,' 92 the court distinguished the De Long and
Ray decisions because "the information was sought by competitors,
and, at least in Ray, the court was unable to prevent disclosure of the
trade secrets to the party-competitor."' 193
A court may order the parties to disclose their trade secret infor-
mation on a "counsel's eyes only" basis. The Xerox court ordered
Xerox "to make available for inspection by defendant (IBM), on a
counsel only basis ... the 21 cartons of documents previously pro-
duced by Xerox to the Federal Trade Commission and the SCM
Corporation."' 94
CONCLUSION
Cases between competitors that allege a misappropriation of
trade secrets pose unique problems for courts and practitioners. Based
merely upon the complaint and answer, courts often are unable to de-
termine whether trade secrets exist or whether a misappropriation has
occurred. The fundamental principles of full disclosure through the
discovery process and of preserving trade secrets conflict. There is a
risk that under the guise of legitimate litigation, a party could use the
discovery process to misappropriate its competitors' trade secrets.
Based on the aforegoing survey of the ways in which courts have
handled this conflict, it appears that three different approaches, used
either independently or in conjunction with the other approaches,
come closest to solving this dilemma. First, courts can require parties
to specify the trade secret that has allegedly been misappropriated or
identify the method for the misappropriation. Based on the specifica-
tion and identification, the parties and courts can narrow the proper
scope of discovery and limit the risk of disclosing trade secrets. Sec-
ond, courts can defer ruling on the discovery of trade secrets until after
resolving other matters. If a case can be resolved on a dispositive
matter that does not concern trade secrets, then there may be no reason
to risk a misappropriation. Third, courts can require some factual
showing or some showing of relevance before permitting discovery.
By a careful application of these methods, courts may protect trade
secrets while preserving the right to pursue meritorious trade secret
litigation.
192. 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985).
193. Id. at 299.
194. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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